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"WHERE THE WINDS HIT HEAVY ON THE
BORDERLINE":* MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW, THEORY AND PRACTICE,
"6US99 AND "6THEM"9
Michael L. Perlin**
A few years ago, I began to use Bob Dylan titles and lyrics as the
embarkation point for all my article and book titles.' I decided to do
this in large part because it is clear to me that Dylan's utterly idiosyncratic "take" on the world provides us with a never-ending supply of
metaphors for an analysis of any aspect of mental disability law.
Among the lyrics that I have drawn on is a line from Dylan's
brilliant song Idiot Wind that I used as the epigrammatic beginning of
an article forthcoming in the Iowa Law Review: "The Borderline
Which Separated You From Me": The Insanity Defense, the Authori* Bob Dylan, Girl of the North County, in BOB DYLAN, LYRICS, 1962-1985,
at 54 (1985).
** Professor of Law, New York Law School; A.B., Rutgers University; J.D.,

Columbia University School of Law.

1. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, "ON THE WATERS OF OBLIVION":
SANISM, PRETEXTUALITY, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL DISABILITY
LAw JURISPRUDENCE (forthcoming 1998); Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity was the
First to Leave": Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally
Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 61 (1996); Michael L. Perlin,
"The Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden" The Role of Counsel and the
Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201 (1996); Michael L.
Perlin, "I'll Give You Shelter from the Storm". Privilege, Confidentiality, and
Confessions of Crime, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1699 (1996); Michael L. Perlin &
Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than "Dodging Lions and Wastin' Time"?
Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 114
(1996); Michael L. Perlin, "Make Promisesby the Hour". Sex, Drugs, the ADA,
and PsychiatricHospitalization,46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947 (1997); Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the PoliticalWorld: The Anthropology of Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1996); Michael L.
Perlin, "No Direction Home". The Law and Criminal Defendants with Mental
Disabilities,20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 605 (1996); Michael L.
Perlin, "There's No Success Like Failure/And Failure'sNo Success at All" Exposing the Pretextualityof Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
1998).
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tarian Spirit,the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment.! So
when Jan Costello asked me to keynote this Symposium, I thought
immediately about that title, about other "borderlines," and, not coincidentally, about other Dylan lyrics about borderlines. I did this
because I believe that the entire subject matter of this Symposiumthe different perspectives that professors, practitioners and mental
health professionals have toward important questions of mental disability law-is about borderlines: the borderline between mental disability law and other areas of criminal, civil, and constitutional law;
the borderline between theory and practice; and, most importantly,
the borderline between "us" and "them." In each case, the borders
are blurred or fuzzy. But, paradoxically, the blurrier and fuzzier they
are, the more important it is for us to attempt to try to draw them
clearly, cleanly, and absolutely.
The line that I used for the Iowa Law Review title reads in its
entirety:
"I been double-crossed now for the very last time and now
I'm finally free,
I kissed goodbye the howling beast on the borderline which
separated you from me."3
I used the borderline metaphor in that context because I was convinced that,
to a significant percentage of the American public, the insanity defense is a "howling beast" that has "doublecrossed" efforts at the implementation of a sane (irony intended) criminal justice system. It is one from which many
of us wish we were "finally free." And, most importantly, it
sits at the "borderline which separates you from me." For I
am convinced, to a majority of the American public, the debate over the insanity defense is a debate over that
"borderline." Our ambivalence over that borderline. Our
need for that borderline. Our wish to deny that borderline.
And until we understand that and come to grips with that,
our 4efforts to understand the defense are doomed to failure.
In preparing that article, it became clear to me that "it [was] im2. Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from Me": The
Insanity Defense, the AuthoritarianSpirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of
Punishment,82 IowA L. REv. 1375 (forthcoming 1998).
3. Bob Dylan, Idiot Wind, in BOB DYLAN, LYRIcs, 1962-1985, at 368 (1985).
4. Perlin, supranote 2 (manuscript at 7).
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portant to us-as individuals and as members of a larger community-to know that there is a 'borderline' separating 'you from me.'
Or, at the least, to believe that there is."5 The insanity defense has
confounded us in our attempts to do this:
On one hand, the insanity defense appears to establish
such a borderline (between those of us who are found to be
criminally responsible for our acts and those of us who are
not). But, on the other hand, a significant portion of society
believes that the insanity defense actually blurs the borderline between good and evil, between "good guys" and "bad
guys."6
Certainly, the debate that raged recently over the Unabomber case,
as reflected specifically in the sub-debate over the relationship between mental illness and insanity, reflected this conundrum.
To remediate this blurring and our discomfort with it, we resort
to a "dogged, banal reliance on [a series of behavioral myths and pretexts that] ... allow us-encourageus-to willfully blind ourselves to
behavioral, scientific, cultural and empirical realities. We do this to
preserve the illusion of a 'borderline' between 'you and me.' 7 I
concluded that the "evanescence of this borderline becomes, in the
end, the reason why, after centuries, our insanity defense jurisprudence continues to operate as it always has-out of consciousness."8
I now propose that the issue of the borderline goes far beyond
the insanity defense and the mental health law/criminal law intersection. It controls and colors all aspects of mental disability law, the
relationships between lawyers, academics, and mental health professionals, and all of our thinking about persons with mental disabilities.
I thus chose another Dylan borderline lyric-"where the winds hit
heavy on the borderline" 9-- to serve as the beginning of my title for
this paper. For the "winds of confusion" here truly do "hit heavy" on
many "borderlines."
I will briefly consider the three sets of borderlines that I have already mentioned: the borderline between mental disability law and
other areas of the law; the borderline between theory and practice;
and, most important, the borderline between "us" and "them." This
Symposium is divided into four major sections: the Americans with
5. Id. (manuscript at 55).
6.1d1
7. IM(manuscript at 56).
8. Id9. Bob Dylan, Girl of the North County, in DYLAN, supra note 3,at 54.
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Disabilities Act (ADA), Sexually Dangerous Predator Laws, juvenile
issues, and therapeutic jurisprudence. If we think about each of
these, we will see that these areas of the law and of interpretation reflect the three sets of borderlines.
Try this projective test on a friend or professional colleague. Say
"the ADA" and see what they come back with. Chances are it will be
"ramps" or "wheelchairs." Try "sexual predators," and the response
will be "Megan's Law." If you say minors and health care, the answer will be "abortion consent." And if you mention "therapeutic jurisprudence," all you will get is a "huh?" On the other hand, if you
were to say "mental health law" to a universe of similar friends or
colleagues, you could be sure that an overwhelming majority would
say, without hesitation, "the insanity defense." This response will
likely arise, regardless of the fact that this defense is successfully pled
in only one-fourth of one percent of all felony cases" and is contested
in only about one-tenth of that minute universe.11 The vividness of a
handful of high-profile, TV talk-show friendly, sensationalistic cases
gives the illusion-and it is only an illusion-that mental health law is
coterminous with insanity defense law. Nearly twenty years ago,
Henry Steadman and Joseph Cocozza asked survey respondents to
list criminally insane persons.' Although forty-two percent of the
participants named at least one individual in response to this inquiry,
none of those listed had been found not guilty by reason of insanity. 3
In reality, the relationship between mental health law and the
three substantive areas that you will be hearing about is a complicated one, and one that blurs borderlines. I will limit my remarks
here just to the ADA, but the same variables apply to the other substantive areas of the law that will be discussed in this Symposium.
By its terms, the ADA applies to persons with mental disabilities, including those with mental illnesses. 4
Yet, very little of the final statute, the legislative history, or

10. See

MICHAEL L. PERLN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY

DFXENSE 108 (1994) (reporting on research of Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Vol-

ume and Characteristicsof.Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19
BULL. AM. ACAD.PSYCHIATRY & L. 331 (1991)).

at 112-13 (reporting on research of Jeffrey L. Rogers et al., Insan11. See id.
ity Defense: Contested or Conceded?,141 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 885 (1984)).
12. See Henry J. Steadman & Joseph J. Cocozza, Selective Reporting and the
Public'sMisconceptions of the CriminallyInsane, 41 PUB. OPINION Q. 523 (19771978).
13. See id. at 527-28.
14. See Perlin, "Make Promisesby the Hour," supranote 1, at 950.
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floor debate focused on the "grotesque" history of discrimination and mistreatment suffered by such individuals; the
crushing economic, social, and psychological burdens borne
by such persons in their day-to-day lives; the conditions
faced by such persons when institutionalized in public facilities, or when discharged from such facilities to lives of
misery on our cities' streets without adequate transitional
mental health, medical or social services; or the pernicious
legal effects that flow from the badge of mental disability.'
At first blush, little in the first generation of ADA cases reflects efforts to remediate this "grotesque history" or deals frontally with
these "social and psychological burdens."16 Most of the reported case
law appears to deal with employment questions not unlike questions
faced in cases of employees with heart disease, malignancies, or lower
back pain. 7 Yet, when some of these cases are read more carefully,
some of the borderline fuzziness begins to emerge.
Courts have denied relief to plaintiffs on the following grounds:
tardiness and laziness are not disabilities;"8 an "ability to get along
with others" is not a "major life activity" covered by the Act; 9 individuals are not protected from the "general stresses of the workplace"; 20persons who become easily angered or have a "low threshold
of tolerance" are not covered by the Act;2' neither a prior diagnosis of
major depression nor a less-than-four-month psychological impairment was enough to establish disability at the time of the plaintiff's
employment; and a depressed employee could not perform her es-

15. Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can
SanistAttitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 24 (1993-1994) (citing City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
16. MICHAEL L. PERLiN, MENTAL DIsABILrrY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
§ 6.44A, at 310-11 (1989 & Cum. Supp. 1997).

17. See id.
at 329-30 n.473.43(d)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1997) (citations omitted).
18. See Thomas v. General Motors Corp., No. 96-2283, 1996 WL 583386, at *1
(7th Cir. 1996); Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995).
19. Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997).
20. Martin v. General Mills, No. 95-C2846, 1996 WL 648721, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
1996); see Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519,526-27 (7th Cir. 1996).
21. Fenton v. Pritchard Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1437, 1446 (D. Kan. 1996).
22. See Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1996)
(involving a plaintiff with a less than four month impairment); Bacon v. Great
Plains Mfg., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 523 (D. Kan. 1997) (involving a plaintiff with major depression); Schwartz v. COMEX, No. 96 CIV.3386 LAP, 1997 WL 187353
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (involving a plaintiff with paranoid thought disorder).
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sential job functions.'
In short, the borderlines of coverage and applicability of the
ADA are blurry and, the closer we look, the relationship between the
Act's application to persons with mental disabilities becomes a more
complicated question. This complexity is replicated no matter what
substantive area of mental disability law we choose to study.
Susan Stefan and Melinda Bird's presentations make this point
perfectly. Professor Stefan underscores that, although the ADA has
been a "fairly successful" litigational tool in Title II public entity
cases, ' that is likely because the "borderlines" in this set of cases are
clear: the plaintiffs in such cases are institutionalized, and thus there
can be no doubt as to the Act's applicability.2s On the other hand, in
the employment cases-which form the heart of her remarks-the
"borderlines are not at all clear," and, as a result, "in... every kind
'
of psychiatric disability Title I ADA case, [the plaintiff] is losing."
One of the reasons why plaintiffs lose these cases is because "courts
reflexively assume that the workplace conditions which preclude
people with psychiatric disabilities from successful employment are
inherent and necessary to the workplace."'
Melinda Bird looks at the ADA from a very different perspective: its potential use in institutional litigation, especially as a means
of enforcing what she refers to as the "integration mandate."
But
even here she notes that courts are afraid to characterize some of the
litigation as seeking "de-institutionalization," although that is evidently its goal. 9 Here again, I believe it is because the public's conflation of "de-institutionalization" and "homelessness"-another disastrous borderline blurring-has so frightened judges that they can
23. See EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997) (regarding a job
that involved monitoring medication levels of residents in a facility for persons
with severe developmental and behavioral disorders); Burke v. Virginia, 938 F.
Supp. 320 (E.D. Va. 1996) (regarding an employee who could not perform the

job of a correction officer because attention deficit disorder was not considered

"disabled" under the ADA).
24. Susan Stefan, Remarks at the Mental Disability Law Symposium 3

(November 15, 1997) (transcript on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 12.
28. Melinda Bird, The IntegrationMandate of the ADA and the Problem of
De-Institutionalization,31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 847, 848 (1998).
29. See id. at 850-51.
30. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and
Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization,28 Hous. L. REV. 63 (1991).
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only mandate relief if it can be categorized under some other, less
threatening rubric.
Let me move to another fuzzy borderline: the borderline between theory and practice. The pages of the law reviews reverberate
with lengthy pieces worrying about the gap between the two." Law
school professors, or so the story goes, sneer at practitioners with
undisguised contempt, born of an insufferable elitism. Practitioners,
on the other hand, scorn professors as insulated theoreticians, far removed from the real world, spinning incomprehensible and dense
theories in an insular jargon.n Mental health professionals often find
both approaches nihilistic and destructive, resulting in the subordination of the needs of mentally disabled persons either to "woollyhaired" talk of civil rights or to high-end theories that ignore "real
world" problems.3 And never the twain shall meet.
A few writers-mostly clinical law professors caught in the
crossfire between the two different "law" worlds and academic/forensic psychologists and psychiatrists writing for "crossover"
journals-have gamely suggested that there can be an accommodation between theory and practice,' but this appears to be more aspi31. As of February 20, 1998, a simple "TI(THEORY & PRACTICE)" search
in Westlaw's LRI database revealed a universe of 587 articles with these two
words in the title.
32. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., "Practice" in Law and Other Professions, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 387, 388 (1997).

[T]here is a correlative change in the relationship between the professions and the professional schools. Whereas the professional schools
had been the vehicle for carrying on the tradition of received learning
and art in the professions, they have become vehicles for specialized research and experimentation that intensifies the centrifugal intellectual
forces being felt in practice. As a result, at the same time that practitioners of the profession face increasing difficulty in talking with each
other, they find it even more difficult to talk with anyone in the academy
except the dean and other fund-raisers.
Id

33. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Book Review, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS.
557, 559-60 (1991) (reviewing ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE
ThuTH ABour DE NsTrrunIONALIZATION (1990)).
34. See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-PracticeSpirab The Ethics of Feminism and ClinicalEducation,75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991); Stephen L. Golding,
Mental Health Professionalsand the Courts: The Ethics of Expertise, 13 INT'L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 281 (1990); Joel Haycock, Speaking Truth to Power: Rights,
TherapeuticJurisprudence,and Massachusetts Mental Health Law, 20 NEw ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301 (1994); Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: Understandingthe Sanist and PretextualBases of Mental Disability Law, 20 N-w ENG. J. ON CRrM. & CIv. CONFiNEMENT 369 (1994); C. Robert
Showalter, PsychiatricParticipation in Capital Sentencing Procedures: Ethical
Considerations,13 INT'L J.L. & PsYCHIATRY 261 (1990).
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ration than reality for most of the law.
But it should not be merely an ideal for mental health law. For it
is here that the borderline between theory and practice is a fuzzy and
blurry one. And it is here that theoreticians must grasp the dynamics
of practice, that practitioners must think carefully about theory, and
mental health professionals must understand how both of these affect
what they do and why they must do it. There is no way to understand
this area of the law without an a priori acknowledgement that the
lines between theory and practice converge and overlap.
The final set of presentations in this Symposium speaks to this
reality. The most important and exciting new insights into mental
disability law jurisprudence of the last two decades have come from
the development-primarily by David Wexler and Bruce Winick-of
the construct of "therapeutic jurisprudence" ("TJ"), a new model by
which we can assess the ultimate impact of case law and legislation
that affect persons with mental disabilities. TJ studies the role of the
law as a therapeutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal
procedures, and lawyers' roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences. It also questions whether such rules,
procedures, and roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their
therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due process principles. 5 While these are fresh, stimulating, and provocative ideas, at
least three caveats need to be added to any therapeutic jurisprudence
analysis.
First, and most importantly, it is clear that an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns "trump"
civil rights and civil liberties. David Wexler underscores this in a recent manuscript: the law's use of "mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] imping[e] upon justice concerns." Therapeutic jurisprudence does not, cannot, and must not
35. See, e.g.,

LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:

DEVELOPMENTS IN THERA-

PEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996);
PERLIN, supra note 16, § 1.05A (Cur. Supp. 1997); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B. Wexler ed., 1990);
DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991); BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED:

ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1997); Bibliography of Therapeutic Juris-

prudence, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 915 (1993); David B. Wexler, Applying

the Law Therapeutically,5 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 179 (1996); David
B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: TherapeuticJurisprudence, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992); David B. Wexler, Reflections on the
Scope of TherapeuticJurisprudence,1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 220 (1995).
36. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Changing Conceptions
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mean, in Nicholas Kittrie's famous phrase, a return to the
"therapeutic state."' Consideration of therapeutic jurisprudence issues cannot be used as an excuse to return to the 1950s when courts
were comfortable simply with a hands-off policy toward mental hospitals and their residents."
Second, familiarity with TJ cannot be limited to the worlds of the
small circle of law professors and academic mental health professionals writing in this area.39 If therapeutic jurisprudence is to be
meaningful, there must be a concentrated outreach to members of
the practicing bar, to frequent forensic witnesses, and to clinicians. 4°
of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993); see David B. Wexler,
New Directions in TherapeuticJurisprudence: Breaking the Bounds of Conventional Mental Health Law Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 759, 762

(1993).
37. NICHOLAS N. KrrrRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND
ENFORCED THERAPY 39-44 (1971).
38. See generally PERLIN, supra note 16, § 1.03 (discussing the implications of
"hands off" policy for subsequent mental disabilities law developments). For examples of standard articulations of the doctrine, see Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d
771, 771 (10th Cir. 1954), and Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950).
Justice Thomas's dissent in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37 (1993), in which
he questions the constitutional underpinnings of the doctrine articulated in
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), regarding the right of incarcerated prisoners to medical care, appears to long wistfully for a return to this jurisprudence.
39. In addition to the work of Professors Winick and Wexler, see sources
cited supra note 35, many other important papers have been published recently.
See, e.g., Keri A. Gould, A Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis of Competency
Evaluation Requests: The Defense Attorney's Dilemma, 18 INT'L J.L. &

PSYCHiATRY 83 (1995); Norman G. Poythress & Stanley L. Brodsky, In the Wake

of a Negligent Release Law Suit An Investigation of Professional Consequences
and InstitutionalImpact on a State PsychiatricHospital,16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.

155 (1992); Robert F. Schopp, The Psychotherapist'sDuty to Protect the Public:
The Appropriate Standard and the Foundation in Legal Theory and Empirical
Premises, 70 NEB. L. REv. 327 (1991); Daniel W. Shuman, TherapeuticJurisprudence and Tort Law: A Limited Subjective Standard of Care, 46 SMU L. REv.
409 (1992).

40. But see Deborah A. Dorfman, Effectively Implementing Title I of the

Americans with DisabilitiesAct for Mentally Disabled Persons: A Therapeutic

JurisprudenceAnalysis, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 105 (1993); Deborah A. Dorfman,

Through a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Filter: Fear and Pretextuality in Mental

Disability Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 805 (1993) (Dorfnan is a litigator
representing persons with mental disabilities); Ira Packer, The Court Clinic in
Massachusetts: A Therapeutic Approach vs. A Rights-Oriented Approach, 20
NEW ENG. J. ON GRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 291 (1994) (discussing the impli-

cations of TJ for court clinic process); Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould,
"Johnny'sin the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine": TherapeuticJurisprudence

and Clinical Teaching (1997) (manuscript awaiting submission, on file with the
authors); Robert L. Sadoff, TherapeuticJurisprudence: A View from a Forensic
Psychiatrist,10 B.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 825 (1993).
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Most importantly, therapeutic jurisprudence must consider-per
John Petrila's perceptive observations4 --the perspective of clients
and consumers of mental health services. Those of us who write in
this field can and must learn from them. In this way, those who are
involved in, or are the subjects of, litigation that deals with mentally
disabled individuals can share their insights into how the therapeutic,
anti-therapeutic, or a-therapeutic aspects of the justice system actually play out. In another recent paper, Joel Haycock speaks to this
directly: "[T]he success of therapeutic jurisprudence will depend in
part on the degree to which it empowers the objects of therapeutic
and judicial attention." 42 This is a challenge that therapeutic jurisprudence can and must meet.
In short, the borderline between theory and practice here is an
indeterminate one. Therapeutic jurisprudence is an available and effective tool through which we can best repel the "winds" that "blow
heavy" at the "borderline" and come to a richer and deeper understanding of the questions before us.
The TJ papers in this Symposium offer a fresh approach to the
theory/practice borderline. Professors Stephen Behnke and Elyn
Saks consider the ways that the law "can promote the mental health
and well-being of individuals who struggle with significant psychological and behavioral difficulties, 43 focusing specifically and
thoughtfully on the nature of the treater/patient relationship and the
way the law affects that relationship. They then examine that relationship in the context of potentially suicidal borderline patients.
Professors Behnke and Saks articulate a series of "lessons" in TJ and
look with special care at the borderline between "best therapeutic
outcome" and autonomy,' concluding that TJ scholars "are simply
going to have to address themselves to normative questions more if
their theory is going to be viable." 45 Finally, Dr. David Stone applies
41. See John Petrila, Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise of Essays in
TherapeuticJurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 877 (1993) (book review). Petrila criticizes therapeutic jurisprudence's methodology for its failure to
explicitly incorporate the perspective of both the voluntary and involuntary con-

sumer of mental health services in crafting a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective. See id. at 881-82.
42. Haycock, supranote 34, at 317 (emphasis added).

43. Stephen H. Behnke & Elyn R. Saks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Informed Consent as a Clinical Indicationfor the Chronically Suicidal Patient with
BorderlinePersonalityDisorder,31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 945, 946 (1998).
44. See id. at 963-67.
45. Stephen H. Behnke & Elyn R. Saks, Remarks at the Mental Disability
Law Symposium 23 (November 15, 1997) (transcript on file with Loyola of Los
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therapeutic jurisprudential principles to a study of what happens
when courts order patients released at a probable cause hearing soon
after their initial hospitalization. These patients, he argues, are often
released prematurely on legal grounds, robbing them of needed psychiatric treatment,4 and, as a result of their premature release, they
take far longer to involve themselves in voluntary post-discharge
outpatient treatment.4 7 His research is provocative and suggests a
connection between legal standards and therapeutic outcomes.
Again, Wexler's caveats as to the limits of therapeutic jurisprudence'
must be reconsidered carefully in light of Stone's research into this
borderline.
Finally, there is the most important borderline of all: the borderline between "us" and "them," between the sane and the insane,
the "crazy" and the "normal." In my earlier Borderline article,
speaking only of the insanity defense, I argued:
Neither our legal system nor our individual psyches has the
tensile strength required to accept the tensions and ambiguities inherent on a maturely functioning insanity defense
system-one in which that "borderline" is inevitably so
deeply blurred. Simply put, we cannot deal with the fact
that insanity-pleading defendants may be more like us than
not like us, and we thus develop elaborate mechanisms
(legal and psychological) to distance ourselves from them
and from that unacceptable reality!'
I believe that this conflict transcends the relatively narrow universe
of insanity defense cases and that it applies to-indeed, explains-the
entire universe of mental disability law cases.
Reflect for a minute on some of the myths that have developed
about persons with mental disabilities:'
1. Mentally ill individuals are "different," and, perhaps, less than
human. They are erratic, deviant, morally weak, unattractive, sexually uncontrollable, emotionally unstable, lazy, superstitious, ignorant, and demonstrate a primitive morality. They lack the capacity to
show love or affection. They smell different from "normal" individuals and are somehow worth less.
Angeles Law Review).
46. See David C. Stone, M.D., Hollywood on the Screen and on the Streets:
The Cuckoo's Nest of LPS, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 983, 986 (1998).
47. See id. at 990.
48. See supratext accompanying note 36.
49. Perlin, supra note 2 (manuscript at 56).
50. See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism,"46 SMU L. RFv. 373,393-97 (1992).
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2. Most mentally ill individuals are dangerous and frightening.
At worst, they are invariably more dangerous than non-mentally ill
persons. Experts can accurately identify such dangerousness.5' At
best, the mentally disabled are simple and content, like children.
3. Mentally ill individuals are presumptively incompetent to
participate in "normal" activities, to make autonomous decisions
about their lives-especially in areas involving medical care-and to
participate in the political arena.
4. If a person in treatment for mental disability declines to take
prescribed antipsychotic medication, that decision is an excellent
predictor of (1) future dangerousness and (2) the need for involuntary institutionalization.
5. Mental illness can be easily identified by lay persons and
matches up closely to popular media depictions. It comports with our
"common sense" notion of "crazy behavior."52
6. It is-and should be-socially acceptable to use pejorative labels to describe and single out the mentally ill. This singling out is
not problematic in the way that the use of other pejorative labels to
describe women, blacks, Jews, or gays might be.
7. Mentally ill individuals should be segregated in large, distant
institutions; their presence threatens the economic and social stability
of residential communities. 3
8. The mentally disabled person charged with a crime is presumptively the most dangerous potential offender, as well as the most
morally repugnant one. The insanity defense is used frequently and
improperly as a way for such individuals to "beat the rap"; insanity
tests are so lenient that virtually any mentally ill offender gets a "free
ticket" through which to evade criminal and personal responsibility.
The insanity defense should be considered only when the mentally ill
person demonstrates "objective" evidence of mental illness.
51. See Saul J. Faerstein, M.D., Sexually Dangerous Predators and PostPrison Commitment Laws, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 895, 898-99 (1998).
52. See Stefan, supra note 24, at 7.
[ udges don't understand the nature of psychiatric disability at all, and
teir] interpretation of the term "disability" of what it means to be disabled precludes almost any claim of psychiatric disability from being
considered a disability .... [This] doesn't happen in the physical disability arena. Judges interpret disability as static, unchanging and consistent across situations and noncontextual.
Id.

On the disease/disorder/abnormality conundrum, see Faerstein, supra

note 51, at 897-98.
53. See Bird, supra note 28, at 847-48 (discussing the way that many persons
with disabilities remain segregated in large institutions).
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9. Mentally disabled individuals simply do not try hard enough.
They give in to their basest instincts too easily and do not exercise
appropriate self-restraint.
10. If do-gooder, activist attorneys had not meddled in the lives
of the mentally disabled, such individuals would be in institutions
where they belong, and all of us would be better off. In fact, there is
no reason for courts to involve themselves at all in mental disability
cases.
What do these myths have in common? In each instance, we are
doing two things: we are distancing ourselves from mentally disabled
persons-the "them"-and we are simultaneously trying to construct
an impregnable borderline between "us" and "them," both to protect
ourselves and to dehumanize what Sander Gilman calls "the Other."''
The label of "sickness" reassures us that "the Other"-seen as "both
ill and infectious, both damaged and damaging"---is not like us56'' and
'
further animates our "keen... desire to separate 'us' and 'them.
I use the word "protect" self-consciously. We exaggerate the
danger of all mentally ill persons to remove any ambiguity about
whether a specific mentally ill person may be dangerous, confounding
mental illness with dangerousness in a variety of ways that simply do
not comport with any of the best available research."S We distance
ourselves from persons with mental disabilities so as to protect our
54. CHRISTOPHER HARDING & RICHARD W. IRELAND, PUNISHMENT:
RHETORIC, RULE, AND PRACrIcE 105 (1989).
55. SANDER L. GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF
SEXUALITY, RACE AND MADNEss 130 (1985).

56. See Perlin, supra note 50, at 389 & nn.113-16. For a discussion on how
our perception of individuals as members of outsider groups affects criminal justice policies, see Jonathan Kelley & John Braithwaite, Public Opinion and the
Death Penalty in Australia,7 JuST. Q. 529 (1990).

Gilman adds:

[T]he most elementally frightening possibility is the loss of control over
the self, and loss of control is associated with loss of language and
thought perhaps even more than with physical illness. Often associated
with violence (including aggressive sexual acts), the mad are perceived

as the antithesis to the control and reason that define the self. Again,

what is perceived is in large part a projection: for within everyone's fantasy life there exists... an incipient madness that we control with more
or less success.
GILMAN, supranote 55, at 23-24.
57. HARDING & IRELAND, supra note 54, at 105.
58. See generally John Monahan, Clinical and Actuarial Predictionsof Violence, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 7-2.2.1 (David Faigman et al. eds., 1997) (reviewing and discussing
the scientific and technical literature pertaining to the prediction of individual

violent behavior).
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self-image that no one will think that they are like us.
Besides demonizing persons with mental disabilities, we also do
something else: we infantilize them. In a recent book manuscript, I
had these thoughts on the way we construct the sexuality of persons
with mental disabilities: 59
This list of questions should underscore the point that this
topic is, indeed, a complex one. Its complexity is further increased (and made more difficult) by society's generally irrational attitudes towards mentally disabled persons. Despite the passage of the ADA and two decades of litigation
on behalf of institutionalized mentally disabled persons
(substantially geared to inquire simply into whether mental
patients are being treated "as human beings")," society
tends to either infantilize such persons (denying the reality
that they may retain the same sort of sexual urges, desires
and needs the rest of us have and generally act on)6 or,
paradoxically, to demonize them (expressing fear of their
hypersexuality and the correlative need of protections and
limitations to best stop them from acting on these primitive
urges).'
59. See PERLIN, "ON THE WATERS OF OBLIVION," supra note 1 (manuscript
at ch. 3E, at 11-12, on file with the author); see generally Michael L. Perlin,
Hospitalized Patientsand the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517 (1993-1994) (discussing the many
complexities clinicians, line workers, administrators, advocates, and attorneys
face in dealing with the sexuality of persons with mental disabilities).
60. Falter v. Veterans' Admin., 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (D.N.J. 1980). On the
impact of legal change on attitudinal change, see Emily Campbell & Alan J.
Tomkins, Gender,Race, Grades,and Law Review Membership as Factorsin Law
Firm Hiring Decisions: An Empirical Study, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 211, 250 n.122
(1992) (reporting on empirical evidence suggesting that, in the years since the
passage of race-based civil rights legislation, "racial attitudes and stereotypes
among white Americans have become more tolerant"); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1650 (1985)
("Where discrimination is not legally or socially approved, social scientists predict that it will be practiced only when it is possible to do so covertly and indirectly.").
61. See Perlin, supranote 50, at 394 (discussing sanist myth that "[a]t the best,
the mentally disabled are simple and content, like children"); see also Mary Romano, Sex and Disability,in DISABLED PERSONS AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS 64
(M. Eisenberg ed., 1982).
62. PERLIN, "ON THE WATERS OF OBLIVION," supra note 1 (manuscript at
ch. 3E, at 12); see also GILMAN, supra note 55, at 24-25, 142-48, 162 (discussing
how society views certain racial and religious minority groups in the same way);
Perlin, supra note 50, at 394 (discussing the sanist myth that "mentally ill individuals ... are invariably more dangerous than non-mentally ill persons").
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We all do this. Jurors and judges do it. Lawyers do it. Scholars
and therapists do it. We are, in short, desperate to erect an impenetrable borderline between "us" and "them." And our incoherent, irrational, sloppy jurisprudence reflects precisely these frantic efforts.
The two other substantive topics discussed in this Symposiumjuveniles and sex offenders-are examples of this infantilization and
this demonization. Mentally disabled juveniles are denied autonomy
in decision making, and are given far fewer procedural rights than

mentally disabled adults;' sex offenders have replaced insanity acquittees as the "most despised" group of individuals in our society"
and are constructed as "monsters" so that we can more easily dehumanize them.6 The characterization of such persons as "mentally
disordered sex offenders" makes this dehumanization far easier for
all of us.
The articles and presentations discussing juvenile issues reflect
these dichotomizations. Professor Jan Costello carefully contrasts
the abortion rights cases-premised on the concept of a "de facto

competent" minor--with the mental disability rights cases-in
which the statutory presumption of competency67 is frequently disregarded in "real life"6--and in so doing demonstrates our profound
social discomfort over certain children with mental disabilities being
granted any autonomy in decision making. Professor James Ellis's
63. See generally Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,584 (1979) (discussing parental
control over minors and the states' ability to control that relationship).
64. Successful insanity defendants have traditionally been perceived as perhaps the "most despised" and most "morally repugnant" group of individuals in
society. See Deborah C. Scott et al., MonitoringInsanity Acquittees: Connecticut's PsychiatricSecurity Review Board, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNrrY PsYCHIATRY

980, 982 (1990). However, sex offenders now seem to suffer that distinction. See
Tara L. Wayt, Note, Megan's Law: A Violation of the Right to Privacy, 6 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REv. 139, 151 n.110 (1997) ("It is not in dispute that sex of-

fenders, especially child molesters, are one of the most despised groups of people
in our society.") see generally Perlin, "There's No Success Like Failure," supra
note 1 (manuscript at 2-3).
65. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American Character Evidence Prohibition:The Importance of Getting the Experiment
Off on the Right Foot, 22 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 296 (1995) ("Certain categories of sex offenders, notably those who prey on young children, are considered
veritable monsters.").
66. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,75 (1976).
67. See, e.g., Rivers v. Katz, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 79 (1986) (construing N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW

§ 33.01 (McKinney 1986)).

68. See Jan C. Costello, Making Kids Take Their Medicine: The Privacy and
Due Process Rights of De Facto Competent Minors, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 907,
908-14 (1998).
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Article returns to the Supreme Court's decision in Parham v. J.R.69
that upheld a commitment scheme granting juveniles far fewer procedural due process rights than adults facing commitment.70 Ellis focuses on an issue rarely examined in this context: the dilemma of the
mentally disabled juvenile who may need mental health intervention
but not total institutionalization.7 The Supreme Court's cold response to arguments in support of a constitutionally-based "least restrictive alternative" doctrine in the mental disability law area72 demonstrates, yet again, our social dis-ease at the blurring of a borderline
that makes "them"-the juveniles with mental disabilities-more like
"us"-persons who do not need total institutionalization.
Finally, James Preis looks at another kind of borderline: the one
between our articulated social dogmas that argue that children should
not be warehoused in psychiatric facilities, and the social reality in
which such warehousing continues.7 Again, our discomfort with the
"other"-and with the reality that the borderline between "us" and
"them" may be more evanescent than we are willing to allow ourselves to believe-interferes with the adoption and promulgation of
coherent social policies.
Why is it this way? Why is it so important to create these borderlines? Why is it so important for us to see this area of the law as a
bundle of discrete, independent packages unrelated to other areas of
the law? Why is it so important for theoreticians and practitioners to
stake out independent territory? And why is to so important for us
to distance ourselves from persons with mental disabilities-the
"other?"
I have worked, taught, thought, and written about this area for
more than a quarter of a century. In this time I have concluded that
two overarching issues dominate and overwhelm the subject matter:

69. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
70. See id. at 604.
71. See James W. Ellis, Some Observations on the Juvenile Commitment
Cases: Reconceptualizing What the Child Has at Stake, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 929
(1998).
72. See generally Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (articulating
a "reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions" standard); cf. Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (using a "less intrusive alternatives" analysis in
a case involving fair trial rights of a competent insanity defendant seeking to resist the involuntary imposition of antipsychotic medication).
73. See James Preis, Advocacy for the Mental Health Needs of Children in
California, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 937 (1998); see also Bird, supra note 28
(discussing deinstitutionalization and the integration mandate).
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mental disability law is sanist,4 and mental disability law is pretextual I am further convinced, beyond any doubt, that it is impossible
to truly understand anything about mental disability law-the doctrine, the debate, the discourse, the decisions, or the dissentswithout first coming to grips with this reality. And, I am equally
convinced that the apparent contradictions, internal inconsistencies,
and cognitive dissonances of mental disability law cannot be understood without understanding the power and pervasiveness of these
concepts.
What do I mean by these terms? Simply put, "sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause-and are reflected in-prevailing social
attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.76 It infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. Sanism is
largely invisible and socially acceptable. It is based predominantly
upon stereotype, myth, superstition and de-individualization and is
sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged "ordinary common
sense" and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events
both in everyday life and in the legal process.78 In her discussion of
74. See, e.g., Perlin, supranote 50, at 374; Perlin, supra note 15, at 21; Michael
L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurorsin Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role
of "Mitigating"Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 239,241 (1994); Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social
Science, and the Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 47,49 (1993).
75. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 34, at 373; Michael L. Perlin, Morality and
Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic
Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
131, 132 (1991); Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental DisabilityLaw: The Case
of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625, 627 (1993).
76. The classic treatment is GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE (Anchor Books 1958). For an important, new, and different per-

spective, see
(1996).

ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES

77. To the best of my knowledge, the phrase "sanism" was coined by Dr.

Morton Birnbaum. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some
Comments on Its Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN

97, 106-07 (Frank J. Ayd, Jr. ed., 1974); see also Koe v.
Califano, 573 F.2d 761, 764 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that "[c]ounsel characterizes this attitude as 'sanism,' and urges that it afflicts the entire legal system.");
Perlin, supranote 30, at 92-93 (discussing Birnbaum's insights). Dr. Birnbaum is
universally regarded as having first developed and articulated the constitutional
basis of the right-to-treatment doctrine for institutionalized mental patients. See
PERLIN, supranote 16, § 4.03, at 8-13 (discussing Morton Birnbaum, The Right to
Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960)).
78. See, e.g., PERLIN, supranote 10.
MENTAL HEALTH CARE
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Justice Thomas's opinion in Kansas v. Hendricks,79 Professor Keri

Gould notes-accurately, in my opinion-that Justice Clarence
Thomas is the most consistently sanist judge on the Supreme CourtY
"Pretextuality" means that courts accept, either implicitly or
explicitly, testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest,
frequently meretricious, decision making. This occurs specifically
where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high propensity
to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired
ends." This pretextuality is poisonous. It infects all participants in
the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blas6 judging,
and, at times, perjurious or corrupt testifying. The articles of Rowan
Klein and Professor Gould both argue persuasively that Hendricks is
a pretextual decision, that the purported promise of treatment to the
defendant, a "sexually violent predator," was a sham-an empty
promise? Certainly, the borderline between "mental patient" and
prisoner is blurred in Hendricks beyond any other case in contemporary constitutional litigation.'
These two concepts have controlled, and continue to control,
modem mental disability law. Just as importantly, perhaps more importantly, they continue to exert this control invisibly. This invisibility means that the most important aspects of mental disability lawnot just the law "in the books," but, more importantly, the law in action and practice-remains hidden from public discussions about
mental disability lawY
It is these concepts that help explain why the "winds hit heavy on
the borderline," to return to my original metaphor. The law's sanism
and the law's pretextuality cause us to feverishly seek to create impregnable borderlines. Yet, if we look closely and reflectively at the
issues before us, we realize that these borderlines do not exist, ex79. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997); see, e.g., Perlin, "There's No Success Like Failure,"
supranote 1.
80. See Keri K. Gould, If It's a Duck and Dangerous-PermanentlyClip Its
Wings or Treat It Till It Can Fly?: A Therapeutic Perspective on Difficult Decisions, Short-Sighted Solutions and Violent Sexual PredatorsAfter Kansas v. Hendricks, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 859,868-72 (1998).

81. Charles M. Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN
L. Rv. 839, 840 (1974); see Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality,supra note

DiEGo

75, at 133.

82. See Gould, supra note 80, at 868-72; Rowan K. Klein, Colloquium Remarks, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 883, 883-88 (1998).
83. See Klein, supranote 82 at 883-87.
84. See, e.g., PERLIN, "ON THE WATERS OF OBLIVION," supra note 1.
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cept, perhaps, in our psyches. When you read the remainder of this
Symposium, think about these borderlines, and think about sanism
and pretextuality. It is these phenomena that encourage us to willfully blind ourselves to behavioral, scientific, cultural, and empirical
realities, so as to preserve the illusion of a "borderline" between "you
and me."' And it is these phenomena that make our jurisprudence in
this area so stupefyingly incoherent.

85. Perlin, supra note 2 (manuscript at 56).
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